Introduction
Since the seminal contributions by Nash (1950 Nash ( , 1953 , bargaining models play a central role in the analysis of situations in which economic agents try to reach an agreement on the split of a certain asset. While there is a huge literature on the efficiency of equilibrium in different noncooperative games 1 , most of the bargaining literature 2 , in order to focus on the split of wealth among negotiating agents, takes as given the pie to be shared.
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However, bargaining processes may have other purposes, beyond the split of a pie. In this paper we illustrate the consequences of applying alternating proposal protocols as a way of solving non-cooperative games. From a technical point of view, the basic difference between our framework and that of bargaining over the split of a pie is that, in ours, two agents bargain about their strategies in a 2x2 game. Apart from the obvious departure from Rubinstein's (1982) model in that the set of possible agreements 3 is finite, in our setup, a confirmed agreement between bargaining agents concerns the pair of independent strategies in the constituent non-cooperative game. This fact increases by one the degrees of freedom and, thus, the dimension of the outcome space, allowing the use of bargaining with alternating proposals as a method of solving noncooperative games.
Assume that two players bargain over the strategy profile to play, given that each player knows the opponent's set of possible strategies. Then, there is a constituent game whose execution leads to the two players' final payoffs and a supergame whose actions in each bargaining period are proposals of strategies for the constituent game. Games with confirmed proposals are interactive strategic situations in which a player, in order to give official acceptance of a contract, must confirm his/her proposed strategy combined with the strategy chosen by his/her opponent. 4 We deal here with constituent games with finite strategy spaces and show that, in the bargaining supergame built on them, the equilibrium outcome can be unique even though each player's strategy space and the stages of the game itself are infinite. We call equilibrium confirmed agreement the corresponding equilibrium contract.
The rules of the bargaining game
Throughout the paper, we assume that only two players are involved in the bargaining game and that they alternate proposals. We mainly focus on a specific family of games with confirmed proposals (GCP henceforth), those with chained proposals. That is, in the case of no confirmation by one player, the non confirmed strategy profile is taken as the new starting point for the subsequent negotiation. Thus, both players have the same power of confirmation and, except for the selection of the first mover at the beginning of the game, the rules of the game are symmetric.
3 For a formal treatment of this issue, see the insightful analysis by Muthoo (1991) .
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Let us denote by S h the finite strategy space for player h (with , h i j  ) in the constituent game, i.e. the strategic situation whose players' strategy profiles induce all the possible agreements of the GCP built on it. This is a bargaining supergame represented by a sequence of alternating proposals of the two players, which ends when a player confirms the proposal he/she made the previous stage in which he/she was active. By construction, the set of possible agreements of the GCP coincides with the set of outcomes of the constituent game, and the set of possible proposals of player h in the supergame coincides with the set of his/her strategies in the constituent game, S h . We refer to the extensive game with perfect information thus defined as the (bargaining) game with confirmed chained proposals. In the following section, we analyze the GCP version of some famous interactive strategic situations, extensively analyzed both in the theoretical and in the experimental literature. First, we show two examples in which the constituent game is a 2x2 static game. Then, we concentrate on three cases where the constituent game is dynamic.
3.
Confirmed agreements in standard two-player games
Static Constituent Game
Consider the GCP version of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). This means that the constituent game is a standard PD and the bargaining game built on it is an infinite supergame with perfect and complete information. The sets of players' feasible proposals in the GCP coincide with their sets of actions in the constituent game: 
The constituent game has the profile ( , ) DD as equilibrium in dominant actions. The same equilibrium outcome would be found in the standard two-stage game 6 , where one of the two players moves first and the other observes his/her "proposal" before choosing his/her own.
Let us now calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the GCP version of the PD game. Throughout the paper, we focus on subgame perfect equilibria in weakly dominant strategies:
we assume that in equilibrium both players bargaining in the GCP choose a strategy that weakly dominates all the others.
Observe Figure 2 . The payoff structure of the bargaining game is the same as in the PD in Proof. Let us consider the infinite game in Figure 2 . The tree branches belonging to the equilibrium path are part of a pair of weakly dominant strategies. More precisely, each player's strategy leads to the following result: the payoff obtained by the player through confirming at a 6 The version without bargaining and without confirmation. The constituent game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: ( , ) OO and ( , ) FF. In the standard two-stage dynamic version of the game, the player moving first 8 has an advantage.
Observe now Figure 4 , which shows the BS with confirmed proposals for the case in which player i is the first mover. Each tree branch marked in bold indicates a partial history inside the equilibrium path; if the active player in a stage is indifferent between two or more proposals inside the equilibrium path, the equilibrium tree branches in that stage are identified with dotted bold lines.
Observe that, surprisingly, there is a first-mover disadvantage: the unique equilibrium confirmed agreement coincides with the Nash equilibrium of the constituent game which is preferred by player j.
Figure 4. BS with confirmed proposals
Proposition 2. The BS with chained confirmed proposals has a unique equilibrium confirmed agreement, involving players' coordination on the constituent game equilibrium favourable to the second mover.
Proof. The game ends with the confirmation of the strategy profile (F, F), whatever is player i's initial proposal. In each of the two subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies, j replies to i's first proposal by indicating the opposite proposal (F if O and O if F) . By doing that, j obliges player i to propose the same action already proposed by him (otherwise, i would confirm her initial action and would get 1 cb  or 3 cb  ). If this action is F, then j confirms F and gets his highest payoff possible. If instead this action is O, then j proposes F and i finds convenient to propose F, since, otherwise, she would obtain 1 cb  ; then j confirms F and gets his highest payoff possible. Therefore, in the first stage player i is indifferent between her two possible proposals. ■ 8 In fact, this is equivalent to a commitment.
Thus, in the BS with confirmed proposals the second mover is able to confirm the coordinating equilibrium outcome of the constituent game more favourable to him.
Dynamic Constituent Game
When the constituent game is dynamic, the confirmed proposal structure can be built by using the strategic form of the constituent game. The set of strategies of each player in the constituent game corresponds to the set of possible proposals in the corresponding GCP.
Consider, for example, the Trust Game (TG). In the constituent game player i (the truster) Given players' role asymmetries in the constituent game, the resulting GCP involves two possible versions: one in which the truster in the constituent game (i) is the first mover of the bargaining sequence, and one in which the trustee in the constituent game (j) is the first mover of the bargaining sequence. In this last case, j begins the GCP by announcing his intention to grab or to share the higher total profit in case i would trust him. The two versions of the TG with confirmed proposals are represented in Figure 6 .a and 6.b respectively. 9 Notice that, in order for j to confirm an agreement, he has to re-propose the same strategy in two subsequent stages in which he is active. According to this rule, for example ( , , ) S T G is not a terminal history of the GCP, even though both strategy profiles ( , ) TS and ( , ) TG induce the same terminal history in the constituent game. For the two GCP in Figure 6 , the following result holds.
Proposition 3. The TG with chained confirmed proposals has a unique equilibrium confirmed agreement, the cooperative one. This agreement is immediately confirmed by the first mover in the GCP.
Proof. Given that both players follow strategies that are weakly dominant, in both GCP in figure 6 , at each stage t each player would: (1) confirm his/her most preferred agreement if he/she is given the possibility in that stage; (2) confirm agreements other than his/her most preferred if: (2.1) in some stage ˆ tt (with ˆ  t ) of the equilibrium continuation path, his/her opponent will confirm an agreement not better for him/her than the one he/she could confirm in t; (2.2) by not confirming in t, neither (1) nor (2.1) applies to any stage t + k, with 1,...,   k , and the best agreement he/she could confirm when he/she is active in the continuation game is the same he/she could confirm in stage t. When the first mover is player i, in stage 3 she would confirm ( , )
TSbecause of (1). She would confirm also ( , ) DG because of (2.1), and ( , ) DS because of (2.2). Instead, she would not confirm ( , ) TG , given that none of the above mentioned cases applies. Hence, she would propose D after history ( , ) TG . In stage 4, after ( , , ) T G D , player j is indifferent between confirming the agreements ( , ) DG and proposing S. In both cases the payoffs are ( , ) ij dd , since, if he proposes S, in the subsequent stage, player i would confirm ( , ) DS because of (2.2) (as we have previously seen after history ( , ) DS ). Thus, the subgame perfect equilibrium path is ( , , ) T S T , with i confirming the agreement ( , ) TSin stage 3. When the first mover is player j, in equilibrium he TG because of (1), ( , ) TSbecause of (2.1) and he is indifferent between confirming or not the agreements ( , ) DG and ( , ) DS because of (2.2) (as we have already seen when the first mover is the player i, after history (T,G,D) ).■ Notice that, as in the example of the BS, in both versions of the TG with confirmed proposals, the second mover reciprocates in stage 2 the first-mover's proposal: he/she cooperates if the first-mover's proposal is cooperative ( S if T and T if S , respectively) and does not cooperate otherwise ( G if D and D if G , respectively) . The two possible versions of the EG with confirmed proposals are represented in Figure 8 . The first version, in Figure 8 .a, represents the case in which player i, the potential entrant in the constituent game, moves first in the corresponding GCP. In the second version - Figure 8 .b -player j, the incumbent in the constituent game, is the first mover. For both GCP in Figure 8 , the following result holds.
Consider now the dynamic Entry Game (EG
Proposition 4. The EG with chained confirmed proposals has two payoff-equivalent confirmed agreements, which involve the entrant to stay out.
Proof. For the version of the game in Figure 8 .a, where the first mover is player i, the proposition can be proved using the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 4. Notice that in the two GCP (Figure 4 Therefore, in both GCP in Figure 8 , there is an equilibrium confirmed agreement in which the incumbent threatens to fight, ( , ) SF , and an additional one in which he would accommodate in case his opponent would enter, ( , ) SA. In both agreements the potential entrant accepts to stay out.
If player i is the first mover (Figure 8 .a), in equilibrium she will either immediately confirms the SA or she will no longer be able to confirm any agreement at all; if she is not the first mover (Figure 8 .b), in equilibrium she will never be able to confirm any agreement. Notice that, in the GCP version of the EG, the following properties hold:
(i) only two agreements can be confirmed in equilibrium;
(ii) the two equilibrium confirmed agreements are payoff-equivalent;
(iii) both of them are Pareto efficient;
(iv) none of them is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the constituent game;
(v) in one of the two equilibrium agreements player i's strategy is not even a best reply in the constituent game;
(vi) the second mover in the constituent game (j) is able to benefit from the confirmed proposals structure, getting his highest payoff possible; 10 Recall that given that confirmation is achieved through re-proposal of the same strategy, histories like ( , , ) AR F AA are not terminal for the GCP, even though both strategy profiles ( , ) F AR and ( , ) F AA induce the same terminal history in the constituent game. For both GCP in Figure 10 , the following result holds.
Proposition 5. The UG with chained confirmed proposals has infinite subgame perfect equilibria, leading to two payoff-equivalent confirmed agreements, which involve the egalitarian outcome.
Proof. The proof is similar for the two versions of the GCP. Consider the first version of the game, where i is the first mover (Figure 10 .a). Player i is never able to confirm her most preferred x A R . This follows from the fact that player i knows that she could never obtain the confirmation of an agreement which would impose player j to accept an unfair offer. Therefore, whenever she has to choose between continuing the game through the terminal sub-history ( , , , ) U AR F AR and confirming an agreement ( , ) F Ax , with ,  x A R , she is indifferent according to condition (2.2) (see proof of Proposition 3): both agreements allow player i to get her second highest payoff possible and player j to get his highest payoff possible. ■ Therefore, there is an infinite number of subgame perfect equilibria. In each GCP in Figure   10 we indicated the unique equilibrium terminal history leading to confirm the agreement ( , )
F AA in stage 3 and two among the infinite possible histories leading to confirm the agreement ( , )
F AR in a stage 3  t . Both kinds of agreements lead to a fair division.
Quite surprisingly, the equilibrium agreements of the confirmed proposals version of the UG satisfy the same features (i) -(viii) characterizing the equilibria in the EG with confirmed proposals. In this regard, note also the strong similarity between the subgame perfect equilibrium paths of TG with confirmed proposals in Figure 6 .a and those of the PD with confirmed proposals in Figure 2 . The same holds for the EG with confirmed proposals in Figure 8 .a and the BS with confirmed proposals in Figure 4 . Finally, for the three GCP in Figure 4 (BS), 8.a (EG) and 10.a (UG) it is common that a first-mover disadvantage exists, while instead the relative constituent games are characterized by a first-mover advantage.
All these results suggest that the confirmed proposal mechanism works in the same way for dynamic constituent games with different strategic structures.
Conclusions
Throughout the paper, we have defined Games with Confirmed Proposals (GCP) and shown their effect on agents' ability to coordinate on Pareto efficient outcomes even in cases in which they are not equilibrium outcomes of the constituent non-cooperative game. Our focus was on a confirmed proposal mechanism with a chain requiring that each non-confirmed strategy profile becomes the starting point for the next negotiation round. One could discuss the implications of breaking this chain on the main features of the confirmed proposal mechanism. We leave this for future research.
